From 'Azaadi' to Islamic terror: Modi's journey without maps in Kashmir
From 'Azaadi' to Islamic terror: Modi's journey without maps in Kashmir
Kashmir is adrift. The Narendra Modi government seems to have lost the plot.
There are strong indications that the nature of militancy in Kashmir is changing. The targeting of Amarnath pilgrims is just one straw in the wind. The operation could well have been inspired by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
Perhaps this is why there is an attempt to distance local Kashmiris from the brutal killing of the pilgrims. However, there is another possibility – that this may be the work of a new militant group, a breakaway faction of Hizbul Mujahideen, for example.
The emergence of Zakir Musa, as a self-proclaimed franchisee of the Islamic State, is a strong indication of militants changing strategy in Kashmir. Recall that when Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mohammad Ayub Pandith, was lynched outside the Jamia Mosque in Srinagar, the crowds shouted slogans of “Musa, Musa, Zakir Musa!”
This marked a qualitative shift in the ground situation as only a few weeks ago, Musa’s call for an Islamic Caliphate and his threat to hang Hurriyat leaders who demanded Azaadi at Lal Chowk, had provoked widespread condemnation.
Militants of the Zakir Musa group later urged people not to shout pro-Pakistan slogans at the funerals of those killed in encounters with Indian security forces, nor to drape their bodies in the Pakistani flag. On the heels of this call, came news that on July 12, the corpse of a terrorist Sajad Gilkar of the Hizbul Mujahideen – allegedly involved in the lynching of DSP Pandith – was wrapped in the Islamic State flag for burial.
Surely this is the result of the desperation of the Kashmiris as they see no political respite. Earlier, the Indian establishment and the media raised a false alarm in the rest of India with images of Kashmiri youngsters waving the Islamic State flag. Now, New Delhi’s obduracy in giving no opening for Kashmiris to let off political steam has given birth to a self-styled Islamic State (IS) group in the state.
Security experts claim that as long as Pakistan was encouraging the militants directly or indirectly, the Indian security agencies could have had some understanding of how the situation might escalate. This helped them calibrate their response. Now, they say, not only are there no rules of the game there is complete unpredictability about the nature of the game itself.
One might take some solace in the fact that Kashmiri separatist leaders and ordinary Kashmiris in the Valley have publicly condemned the attack on the Amarnath pilgrims. Their condemnation has been more vociferous than that by the rest of India about daily violence in Kashmir. One can still say, therefore, that all is not lost in Kashmir despite the Modi government’s policy that the situation in the Valley requires only a strong a military response.
What about the rest of India? How has it been impacted by the developments in Kashmir? Can one imagine what the public reaction would have been if the driver of that ill-fated bus carrying Amarnath pilgrims had not been Salim Mirza, a Muslim and a Gujarati to boot?
Communal rhetoric would have fanned further violence against innocent Muslims – besides of course helping to consolidate the Hindu communal vote for the upcoming Gujarat elections. Now even the Hindutva forces in Gujarat have been compelled to grudgingly honour Mirza for his bravery.
However, the implications of the birth of a group that aligns itself with the Islamic State ideology in Kashmir has not fully sunk into the Indian public mind. A few more spectacular terrorist acts could well raise its profile and branding.
And if a ‘caliphate’ can possibly be created within Kashmir then why should misguided and alienated Muslim youngsters from other parts of India smuggle themselves all the way to Iraq or Syria? The Islamic State is in retreat in Iraq in any case and its future in Eastern Syria is bound to become more uncertain in the coming days.
If the defeat in Iraq is going to destroy it as a geographical entity, then Islamic State as an ideological concept will become increasingly decentralised. What we may be witnessing then could be one such local crystallisation of an Islamic State group in Kashmir. It remains to be seen whether disgruntled and ideologically motivated Muslim youngsters then join it.
This cannot bode well for either Kashmir or the rest of India. The rise of IS-style group(s) in Kashmir does not suit even Pakistan. However, the mandarins running the Kashmir policy from Delhi and Nagpur are either unable to see this or are confused about how to respond.
There has been some renewed speculation about appointing a new governor in Jammu and Kashmir. There are rumours that when current Home Secretary Rajiv Mehrishi retires on August 30, he might be sent to J&K as governor. But in the absence of a shift in policy will a mere change of dramatis personae suffice to control the situation?
This government has never heeded the advice of Governor N N Vohra; there is no guarantee that it would be more open to the suggestions of the next incumbent.
Moreover, the role of the governor is extremely limited as long there is an elected government in the state. The appointment of a new governor – especially a non-political administrator – can possibly be seen as an attempt to curb militancy and provide better governance only if the politicians obstructing these policies are removed.
This would mean dismissing the current coalition government of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) and imposing President’s Rule. That seems an unlikely prospect. Without dismissing the state government, therefore, the appointment of a new Governor makes little sense.
The coalition headed by Mehbooba Mufti allows the BJP to partake of the power and the pelf by being in government while all the blame for misgovernance goes to the government’s Kashmiri face, the chief minister.
She is also in no position to object and withdraw from the government – as out of power her party stares into an abyss. Sacking her government does not suit Modi for yet another reason. He would have created one more Kashmiri voice against his government and his party. Once she is out of power Mehbooba Mufti would have no option but to turn against New Delhi’s policies.
Tactically, it may seem that the present situation suits the Modi government. Strategically, however, with the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism of the IS variety, Modi's Kashmir policy is in trouble.
For reasons best known to him, Modi has left the government’s Kashmir policy to the narrow-minded apparatchiks of the Hindutva brigade. The security-centric advisors that have reared their heads like mushrooms in rotting straw, have added fuel to the fire by shaping an extreme and anti-political discourse on Kashmir.
Constant mishandling of the political sentiment of the Kashmiris and misreading their mind has made the situation even worse.
The only realistic option before the Modi government is to initiate a process of dialogue in Kashmir. If it cannot do so openly, the government must consider starting a quiet back channel with the separatist leaders and take stock of their views as well as that of other stakeholders to explore a way forward. Not talking and alienating Kashmiris with further use of force is no longer an option.
However, there are some indications that Modi realises that his Kashmir policy may be doing more harm than good. Because he finds himself in a pickle on Kashmir (and on China), he has sanctioned an all-party meeting to brief the Opposition.
Neither he nor his ministers have consistently briefed the Opposition. When Modi thinks he is onto success, he ensures that he alone stands in the limelight. In seeking the help of other political parties on Kashmir and on China he is possibly trying to repackage himself as a consensus seeker. Essentially, he needs to change policy on both counts and yet not lose face. For the moment, however, he is still the captain of a lost ship with no maps.
Edited by Joyjeet Das